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INTRODUCTION: AUDEN’S SIGNIFICANCE 
With the advent of queer theory in the early 1990s, critics have increasingly sought to 
“queer” texts; that is, seeking out demonstrations of identity that do not fit conventional norms of 
sex, gender, and sexuality. Given the historic persecution of homosexuals and other “deviants” in 
the twentieth century, W. H. Auden is an interesting case when viewed through this lens because 
his expansive career brims with homoerotic (and equally homosexual) undertones. It is not sur-
prising that Auden guarded himself by masking sentiments regarding his sexuality below the sur-
face of his writing, though not so much so that one could not detect it if they knew the coded jargon 
of certain queer communities (Bozorth 709). What Auden said regarding his homosexuality in an 
ethical and moral sense varied over time, creating difficulties in capturing his complete range of 
thought on the matter. Critics widely agree that Auden remained conflicted regarding his sexuality 
and continued to be so for most of his life despite a characteristic affinity for change. For instance, 
if broken down into the heuristic “secular and sacred” view of Auden’s legacy (i.e., the view that 
his poetry shifted from “propaganda” to “parable” upon his immigration to the U.S.), one sees that 
this conflict persists despite supposedly different forms. In his secular period, he suspected homo-
sexuality to be caused by some global psychological disorder, which people suffered from univer-
sally and experienced in different forms psychosomatically; yet upon moving to America and re-
turning to the Catholic faith of his childhood, his concern with homosexuality as illness dimin-
ished, though his focus now turned to its complicated relationship with marriage (Mendelson 365). 
Thus, critics have found much to contend with in tracing Auden’s development of thought 
regarding homosexuality, and there are certainly many analytical highpoints that are worth men-
tioning. There is of course Edward Mendelson, Auden’s literary executor, who has undoubtedly 
laid the foundations for discussions of Auden and sexuality by way of his critical biographies Early 
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Auden and Later Auden. Other authors, chief among them Arthur Kirsch, have likened Auden’s 
doubts of his own “sexual morality” to doubts of faith, recognizing that the two may be closely 
linked and may even inform one another. Some have even proposed “final verdicts” on Auden’s 
part (as I interpret them); Stephen Schuler, for instance, argues that Auden never reached a moral 
resolution (at least one that integrated his sexuality within a Catholic lifestyle), but he nonetheless 
went on with his sexual practices without great concern. Indeed, this perspective echoes another 
of Arthur Kirsch’s arguments which states that frivolity, or respectful mockery of serious business, 
was at the heart of Auden’s views on both sexuality and his religion. Finally, authors like Susannah 
Young-ah Gottlieb and Richard Bozorth have placed Auden within a centuries-long tradition of 
queer radicalism: Gottlieb’s analysis highlights Auden’s simultaneous transgression of sexual and 
religious norms, which deemed him as both deviant and ineligible to marry, while Bozorth uses 
the context of queer history to argue that many of Auden’s earlier poems are protests not only 
against fascist politics but also heteronormative oppression. While these paradigm-shifting contri-
butions are critical to the analysis I will conduct in this thesis, none of these works has given direct 
attention to the relation between Auden’s sexuality and faith as a prototype for future generations 
of religious queer people. 
In 1947, Auden wrote that “sexual fidelity is more important in a homosexual relationship 
than in any other,” further elaborating that “in other relationships there are a variety of ties. But 
here, fidelity is the only bond” (qtd. in Bozorth, “Tell Me,” 200). This statement, while appearing 
to simplify the dynamic components of a same-sex relationship down to a single stipulation, im-
plies something much more complex. On the one hand, it speaks to a variety of privileges that are 
barred from homosexuals which would otherwise strengthen or solidify their romantic relation-
ship. Among these withheld privileges is marriage—a ceremony that both the Catholic Church and 
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the U.S. federal government (along with all other world powers) barred Auden from participating 
in, as both entities denied legal recognition of homosexual marriage during his lifetime. Thus, 
Auden’s emphasis on his own fidelity is rather poignant, as it is effectively a stand-in for the con-
secration—and perhaps validation—he yearned for. Auden’s emphasis on sexual fidelity, then, 
suggests that this is the only tie that can sustain homosexual relationships because it is self-regu-
lated, and self-regulation is the only option in a social environment that invalidates queer couples. 
Such public statements are but a microcosm of Auden’s lifelong interest in the relationship 
between his homosexuality and his Catholic faith, particularly with respect to marriage, which he 
viewed as among other things a potential meeting ground for the two. As other scholars have pos-
ited, Auden’s contemplations were far ahead of his time—so much so, I would add, that they bear 
striking resemblance to the views of a contemporary queer-religious movement known as “Queer 
Christianity,” which I define as the theological concepts and practices of a diverse set of LGBTQ+ 
individuals (along with the support of their allies) who, like Auden, felt at one point compelled to 
justify their gender or sexual orientation with respect to their Christian faith. Herein, I will examine 
Auden’s literary rhetoric and experiences between 1939 and 1941; this is the period in which Au-
den and Chester Kallman were “married,” and what emerges is a bold transgression of religious 
and secular homophobia which, amidst its larger demands for global justice, legitimizes same-sex 
marriage and, as a result, renders Auden’s work that of a proto-queer theologian. My analysis will 
be comprised of four close readings of Auden’s early American poems, in order of their composi-
tion: “Like a Vocation” (1939), “Law Like Love” (1939), New Year Letter (1940), and “In Sick-
ness and in Health” (1940). These works reflect Auden’s general progression of thought in regard 
to his newfound marriage, which begins to coincide with other, more commonly recognized pre-
occupations of Auden’s; the most prominent of these include an impending global crisis 
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perpetuated by nationalistic violence and the persistent desire to create a diversified, communal 
space in which such a crisis may be averted. Prior to my analysis, I will also briefly explore per-
sonal milestones of the 1930s which may have influenced Auden’s later progression of thought. 
Additionally, I will describe the essential elements that constitute twenty-first Queer Christian 
thought, which significantly resemble the themes of Auden’s 1939-1941 works. 
As a further matter, the selected poems between 1939 and 1941 are not only indicative of 
Auden’s conceptualizing but also characteristic of what most critics describe as Auden’s unique 
charm as a poet: they represent at once the utter seriousness and playful frivolity that Auden brings 
to his work, a choice that is equally shocking and refreshing. According to Peter Firchow, em-
blematic of this spirit is Auden’s “Dirge”: what is presumably an elegy for President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt nonetheless “shifts in and out of the serious, the not-so-serious, and even the 
funny. This is undoubtedly odd for an elegy. But such sudden and jarring shifts in diction and tone 
are (and were already) characteristic of Auden’s poetry, even in formal elegiac contexts” (457). 
Firchow continues by highlighting the persistence of this poetic spirit in modern contexts, which 
survives in no small part thanks to Auden; in regard to the American poet Richard Howard’s “el-
egies” for Auden, which reveal “a very personal truth about being homosexual,” he states that 
“only after Auden came to America did it become possible for a ‘serious’ American poet like 
Howard to publish a ‘song’ like this one, with its offhand and quite casual confession about its 
author being a ‘cocksucker’” (468). Accounts such as these exemplify the inherent value of Au-
den’s poetry today, not so much in its content but in its underlying spirit, which almost always 
finds a balance between audacity and prudence, action and contemplation, and reverence and trans-




AUDEN BEFORE MARRIAGE 
While Auden discovered that he had lost his faith in 1922, at around the age of fifteen 
(Spender 9), his poetry nonetheless brimmed with Christian imagery and contemplation. Frag-
mented identity, as well as attempts to remedy that uncertainty, characterizes much of his poetry 
of the 1930s and is not limited exclusively to the spiritual. Following his year abroad in Berlin, 
Auden’s 1932 long poem The Orators partially reflects an attempt to self-therapize, particularly 
to end the “storm-and-stress period of his sexual adolescence” (Davenport-Hines 88) and to mod-
erate his sexual behavior. His dissatisfaction with hypersexuality is, of course, linked to the moral 
principles of his Christian upbringing, which stuck with him even after his defection (Davenport-
Hines 100). With regard to his views on homosexuality, however, Auden seems at this time more 
concerned with the internecine strife within homosexual communities; in 1932, he told John Pud-
ney, “we are all sex-obsessed today […] because there isnt [sic] any decent group life left” (qtd. 
in Davenport-Hines 114). This absence of “group life” is explored further in The Orators, wherein 
a certain character demonstrates a “specialised sensibility” (110) that allows him to identify other 
homosexuals effortlessly, an ability which binds him to others of the same sexual disposition and 
holds the potentiality for a deeper, more intimate sense of community. In other words, likeness in 
being homosexual, not merely sexual compatibility or mutual desire, provides a template through 
which to foster deeper connections between individuals. 
Only a year later, Auden experienced firsthand that sense of connection in its most visceral 
form. One evening in June, he received unexpectedly what he later termed his “Vision of Agape”:  
I was sitting on a lawn after dinner with three colleagues, two women and one man. We 
liked each other well enough but we were certainly not intimate friends, nor had any one 
of us a sexual interest in another. [….] I felt myself invaded by a power which, though I 
Bisson 6 
 
consented to it, was irresistible and certainly not mine. For the first time in my life I knew 
exactly because, thanks to the power, I was doing it – what it means to love one’s neighbor 
as oneself. [….] My personal feelings towards them were unchanged […] but I felt their 
existence as themselves to be of infinite value and rejoiced in it. (qtd. in Davenport-Hines 
132) 
Undoubtedly, Auden perceived his vision to be of a spiritual essence, as he remarked later that “at 
the time it occurred, I thought I had done with Christianity for good” (132). As he recalls, the sense 
of community he experienced by way of this vision was not sexual, nor was his sense of commu-
nity constituted solely by those who were attracted to one another; nevertheless, Auden’s desire 
for meaningful “group life” was actualized briefly at that moment, certainly to a greater degree 
than what he had envisioned in The Orators. This “transfiguration of love” (131) is, according to 
Richard Davenport-Hines, but one step (albeit a crucial one) in Auden’s journey toward a more 
concrete spirituality, which culminated around the same time as his marriage to Chester Kallman 
in 1939. Following his 1933 vision, Auden would write the poem “A Summer Night” that same 
month, in which he predicts “a major upheaval […] that, when [it] is over, the lyrical love which 
the poem celebrates – part Eros, part Agape – will play a part in the re-establishment of civiliza-
tion” (Carpenter 162-63). The sheer magnitude of this prediction coincides with Auden’s yearning 
for an authentic group life, only now he conceives that this group constitutes all of humanity.  
In the years leading up to his first encounter with Chester Kallman in 1939, Auden would 
continue with his “hope of discovering a course of action which could alleviate the evils of soci-
ety,” which would, in turn, bring society closer towards a sustained Agape (Carpenter 180). His 
poetry would continue to operate as a sort of self-interrogation with respect to his individual role 
in society, and the search for a possible answer likely motivated his excessive travels during this 
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period; his destinations included Portugal, Iceland, Hong Kong, and Spain during the Civil War of 
the late 1930s. It should be mentioned that Auden enlisted in 1937 as a volunteer ambulance driver 
for the Spanish Communists, but shortly thereafter found himself disillusioned by division and 
dissent within their movement: theirs was not the unified, infallible remedy for all social ills he 
was looking for. His time in Spain had not been the first time that the woes of the interwar period 
had an effect on Auden; the proliferation of violence across Europe and elsewhere granted Auden 
keener insight into the darker instincts of humankind—an insight which operates as the “necessary 
counterpart” to his vision of Agape in 1933 (Davenport-Hines 153). These two opposites con-
trasted one another in much of Auden’s poetry of the 1930s, depicting at once the widespread, 
horrific violence of the early twentieth century and the desperate need for an outpouring of selfless 
love to end it. Auden would not find the means of achieving that love until his immigration to the 
United States in 1939, where he would meet Chester Kallman for the first time. 
Auden had only been residing in New York City for about three months before his first 
encounter with Kallman. On April 6, 1939, Auden and his long-time friend and literary collabora-
tor Christopher Isherwood were scheduled to give a public reading for the League of American 
Writers. Auden read his elegy “In Memory of W. B. Yeats” to a sizeable audience that included a 
group of students from Brooklyn College; these students, Chester Kallman among them, ap-
proached Auden and his colleagues in hopes of receiving an interview for their literary magazine, 
The Observer (Farnan 18). In retrospect it may come as a surprise that, while Kallman was making 
his request to the man directly, Auden found himself fixated on another Brooklyn student, Walter 
Miller, who was chatting with Isherwood. Auden obliged Kallman’s request mainly in hopes that 
Miller would accompany him—yet two days later, on April 8, the date set for their interview at 
Auden’s residence, he would find himself utterly disappointed: Kallman arrived alone. Leaving 
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Kallman momentarily at his doorstep, Auden approached Isherwood in another room and stated 
bluntly, “It’s the wrong blond” (qtd. in Farnan 20). Their interview, to no surprise, began with 
considerable discomfort, though Auden’s disposition towards Kallman changed quickly as they 
began to discuss the Renaissance poet Thomas Rogers; according to biographer Dorothy Farnan, 
Auden recognized in Kallman a “kindred spirit,” which likely triggered something “conscious, 
unconscious, [and] inexplicable” in Auden (20-21).  
Following their interview, the two began to see one another more frequently, and their new 
relationship moved rather quickly. One month later, Auden would publish “The Prophets,” one of 
many poems that Auden claimed to have grown out of his love for Kallman (Carpenter 262). In it, 
the speaker claims to have found  
the answer from the face 
That never will go back into a book 
But asks for all my life, and is the Place 
Where all I touch is moved to an embrace 
And there is no such thing as a vain look. (Auden, “The Prophets,” 203) 
Interestingly, the “answer” this speaker is looking for is, on the one hand, found in the face of their 
lover, possibly implying that the lover themselves is the answer to some unspecified predicament. 
The speaker also suggests that their lover is quite literally the “Place” where love is transfigured; 
this is evident in the way “touch”—ephemeral and sensory—becomes an “embrace,” an experience 
that is both physically and emotionally intimate. It is no coincidence that this passage mimics 
Auden’s views on the utility of Eros (a more passionate, sexual form of love) in achieving his 
desired Agape, the selfless, compassionate love which he believed to be a starting point in reme-
dying the world’s ever-increasing discord. Read with this framework in mind, “the answer” found 
Bisson 9 
 
in the lover’s face takes on an entirely different meaning: they are the means through which to 
achieve that Agape and, perhaps, to extend that love elsewhere. An unverifiable conclusion would 
be to simply state that the speaker and the lover of “The Prophets” are symbolic of Auden and 
Kallman; indeed, it is important to acknowledge the danger in “identify[ing] Auden’s love-poetry 
too closely with one lover or set of circumstances, so much did he transmute his personal experi-
ences before making them into verse” (Carpenter 262). A poem that Auden wrote to Kallman on 
his twentieth birthday speaks to this transmutation of reality: 
In harness the Two are a fine combination 
But a little too fond of the mirror—Beware 
When you look in one then of the fair fascination 
Provided by that ingenious pair […] (qtd. in Farnan 27) 
While “The Prophets” flaunts an absence of vanity and self-interest, here we see the speaker 
acknowledge deliberately an overabundance of both: the lovers are “too fond of the mirror” and, 
hopeful of preserving the ingenuity of their pairing, the speaker pleads with the recipient to avert 
their eyes.  
Likely, this is a more accurate depiction of Auden’s relationship with Kallman, though its 
imperfect nature did not stop him from glorifying their bond. Within the first year of their relation-
ship, Auden began to wear a gold wedding band, bought another for Kallman (who refused to wear 
it), and declared himself married in every sense of the word (Farnan 22). He became deeply in-
trigued with The Observer, expressed a desire to get closer to Kallman’s family, and shared many 
of Kallman’s interests, which included Italian opera (28). Auden’s fervency during this period, in 
no small part contributing to the relationship’s eventual downfall in 1941 (Davenport-Hines 209), 
equipped him with a keen sense of certainty that he brought to his work. During the spring and 
Bisson 10 
 
summer of 1939, he produced several drafts of “The Prolific and the Devourer,” an essay that 
argues for “laws which govern human life,” which, despite being expressed on “purely humanist 
and non-religious grounds” (qtd. in Carpenter 268), are for the purposes of convenience referred 
to as “divine laws” (qtd. in Carpenter 269). He further declares that “there are two and only two 
philosophies of life, the true and the false [….] the [true] Way cannot be codified as a philosophy: 
that would be to suppose that perfect knowledge of the whole of reality is possible, indeed that it 
is already known” (qtd. in Carpenter 269). Stating that religion serves to delineate divine law, he 
continues, “If anyone chooses to call our knowledge of existence knowledge of God, to call Es-
sence the Father, Form the Son, and Motion the Holy Ghost, I don’t mind: nomenclature is purely 
a matter of convenience…But no religious dogma…can be anything but poetry” (qtd. in Carpenter 
269). While Auden would later disavow the piece, particularly for its tone of unerring superiority 
(Carpenter 274), the influences that drove his reconversion in 1940 are clear.  
It is not by coincidence that Auden interprets authentic religion—or at least what he con-
siders it to be—in non-supernatural, non-sanctimonious terms. Given that Auden’s love for Kall-
man was a major, if not the most important, component of his return to Christianity, a natural 
conflict arose in the way of the homosexual nature of their marriage. He contended with this prob-
lem in part by simply paying it little mind. This is not to say that Auden had no qualms with respect 
to his homosexuality as it related to his faith; indeed, Christopher Isherwood once stated that “[Au-
den’s] religion condemned it and he agreed that it was sinful, though he fully intended to go on 
sinning” (qtd. in Carpenter 299). Nevertheless, Isherwood’s remark does not fully encapsulate 
Auden’s views on the matter. Three reasons can be traced as to why Auden believed his attitude 
did not conflict with his reclaimed Christian identity. While the first two are mainly self-deroga-
tory, the third is quite telling in that it coincides with his views expressed in “The Prophets” as 
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well as “A Summer Night”: “[Auden] argued that to undervalue sexual love was actually heretical: 
it denied the goodness of the physical bodies created by God” (300). Thus, Auden’s love for Kall-
man, of a supposedly more profound essence than mere sexual attraction, was corrective of the 
sexual “immorality” that may have underpinned their marriage. The critical influence of these 
assumptions is furthermore, reflected in much of Auden’s poetry between 1939 and 1941: they 
function as an amalgamation of Auden’s desire for an outpouring of love, or Agape, his abhorrence 
of the modern world, and the potentiality he saw in his marriage as a method of “achieving” the 
first and remedying the second. 
 
QUEER CHRISTIANITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Despite the better part of a century separating Auden’s poetry and the rhetoric of Queer 
Christians, there are certain ideological pillars that persist through time and form the basis of both 
parties’ poetic and rhetorical practices. Regarding Queer Christianity, the most distinct of these 
pillars include the acquisition of a selfless love in pursuit of forming genuine, empathetic commu-
nity with others, as well as the rejection of heteronormative, systematic theology in favor of 
queered—and therefore more accurate and encompassing—theological perspectives.  
First and foremost, in recognizing Queer Christianity’s critical ties to queer theology, it is 
important to understand what this term truly means. In Radical Love: An Introduction to Queer 
Theology, Patrick S. Cheng, ordained minister and Professor of Historical and Systematic Theol-
ogy at Episcopal Divinity School, defines three essential components to queer theology:  
First, queer theology is LGBT people “talking about God.” Secondly, queer theology is 
“talking about God” in a self-consciously transgressive manner, especially in terms of chal-
lenging societal norms about sexuality and gender. Third, queer theology is “talk about 
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God” that challenges and deconstructs the natural binary categories of sexual and gender 
identity. (9) 
Cheng’s definition of queer theology is both overlapping and encompassing, given that it asserts 
access to queer and non-queer people to perform said theology and accepts any level of transgres-
sive actions against heteronormative categories—the same logic that constitutes Queer Christian-
ity. Deliberate works of queer theology—or at the very least “LGBT-positive” theology—can be 
traced back to the mid-1950s and are rooted primarily in other theological forms, namely apolo-
getic theology (e.g., “gay is good”), liberation theology, and relational theology (Cheng 26). An-
other essential component of queer theology, presenting itself most clearly in Cheng’s third defi-
nition, is queer theory, which engages broadly in the “debunking of stable sexes, genders and 
sexualities” (Jagose 3); its assumptions and strategies coincide with queer theology’s attempt to 
erase both physical and metaphysical boundaries that push queer people out of heteronormalized 
(i.e., binarized) spaces. Where queer theory becomes most effective in supporting queer theology 
is its presupposition that binaries of sex, sexuality, and gender are social constructions that obscure 
the reality of the human condition. In other words, experiences of these categories fall more accu-
rately along a nonlinear spectrum, and it is the hope of queer theologians that, by reflecting openly 
upon this spectrum, namely through scripture, tradition, reason, and experience (Cheng 11), binary 
discourses may be transgressed and space may be provided for a breadth of religious experiences. 
It is these essential components which fortify queer theology and, as a result, inform my under-
standing of modern Queer Christianity. 
Akin to the necessity of Auden’s transfiguration of love, a Queer Christian’s understanding 
of God’s Love is closest to the phrase “agape,” an Ancient Greek word which represents “the 
highest form of love”; this is a love that is selfless, unconditional, inclusive, and therefore radical. 
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As Cheng states in his foreword to Radical Love, “radical love is at the heart of Christian theology 
because we Christians believe in a God who, through the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and 
ascension of Jesus Christ, has dissolved the boundaries between death and life, time and eternity, 
and the human and divine” (x). Cheng names but a few of these false binaries which are trans-
gressed ultimately by God’s will as a means of bridging the gaps between people, regardless of 
differences on the basis of sex, sexuality, and gender. This will, in and of itself, is radical love, 
sent forth by God to expose and dismantle stifling human boundaries (51). Under this premise, 
queer people stand as harbingers of this love, challenging assumptions regarding sexuality and 
gender, which include, among others, “the categories of female and male, and homosexual and 
heterosexual” (51). These beliefs have been expounded by others; in 2018, Father James Martin, 
a Jesuit priest, proclaimed that LGBT people “are loved by God. [.…] [He knows] them in the 
complexity of their lives, celebrating with them when life is sweet … loving them like Jesus loved 
people on the margins, which is extravagantly” (qtd. in Falsani par. 12). Tellingly, these assertions 
are not grounded upon reinterpretations of Scripture; at their core, they rely upon some of the most 
fundamental Biblical lessons: to “love thy neighbor as thyself” (King James Bible, Matt. 22.39)—
the same virtue which Auden encountered unexpectedly in 1933—and that Jesus would stand al-
ways on the side of the marginalized. 
 Of equal importance to the conception of radical love is its physical expression via the 
flesh. Many queer theologians posit that this expression often manifests itself in the erotic and 
stands on equal grounds with its Agapian counterpart, though this is a belief that many still take 
issue with to this day; as Cheng explains, “people throughout the history of the church have held 
the dualistic view that matter is evil and spirit is good. This arises out of the Platonic view that the 
abstract world of forms is ‘higher’ than the world of matter, which includes our bodies and 
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sexualities” (62-63). As mentioned previously, while Auden found eventual utility for his erotic 
desires, he viewed Eros primarily as a means to an end in achieving Agape, or the “higher” form 
of love that Cheng describes. Queer Christianity interprets these forms of love differently than 
Auden, typically viewing the two as dyadic rather than hierarchical. Such a dyadic view is captured 
best in Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology:  
Born out of a split relationship between eros and agapian love, Christ has become the lust-
less messiah of systematic theologians. Why ‘either/or’? Why choose between agapian and 
erotic love? Why these two separate concepts and a fence between them, ordering them by 
alphabetic categories? What sordid or brilliantly passionate stories are hidden behind the 
love which is constructed as de-eroticized? (120) 
In the context of Latin American liberation theology, Althaus-Reid advocates for the divine power 
of intense sexual desire, especially that of “illicit lovers […] [which] carries that of life in itself,” 
as “this is what moves them to feel a loving commitment to their lives and a strong passion for 
destruction of the oppressive structures” (125-26).  In this vein, the erotic plays a crucial—and 
equally central—role in religious worship, as sexual desire becomes the source through which 
heteropatriarchal dogma is challenged and destabilized. This emphasis on religious expression 
through the physical is, according to some, reflected through the body of Jesus himself; for in-
stance, Angel F. Méndez Montoya, Professor of Philosophy of Religion at the Ibero-American 
University, states that “Christ’s mystical body is already political, the co-abiding of a nondivisive 
body conjoined by both human and divine desire, responding to the hunger of and for the Other, 
emerging in a space and time wherein eros and agape constitute one another. Within this queer 
body-politics, otherness is always welcomed” (326). Additionally, it is important to note that while 
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Auden’s Eros played a sequential role in his theological vision, he nonetheless writes explicitly 
about the erotic during his marriage, thereby acknowledging the essential role it occupies. 
Queer Christians believe that this same love—expressed equally through Agape and 
Eros—aids in the destruction of barriers that seek to divide and oppress, thereby fostering border-
less community. Queer theologians agree that the nature of God’s existence as the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit defies standard notions of the “self” and “other,” and these three identities are at 
once “coequal and co-eternal” (Cheng 56). This Trinity defies other binary categories as well; 
regarding queer experience specifically, the fluid and interpenetrative qualities of the Trinity pro-
vide counterevidence to common notions of “fixed” identities (60). Borderless community is also 
depicted symbolically through the church; as Cheng states, “the church was a new community that 
dissolved traditional boundaries that kept people apart such as biological relationships, social class, 
and physical attributes”—a development that is taken a step further when we consider the ways in 
which the “church” subsumes a plethora of sexual and gender identities today (106). As these 
theologians have posited, queer people not only stand to benefit from these divine implications, 
but are also suited uniquely to expand and diversify systematic theological discourses through 
personal experience; in discussing the queer process of “coming out,” Marcella Althaus-Reid 
enunciates how narrativization of this process “give[s] a testimonial with an affirmation of what 
normativity has denied. The first [component] creates an order of conformity, the second, a net-
work of rebellious people, the sort of rebellion which nurtures theology with a deeper questioning 
of life [….] somehow, [coming out narratives] are more authentic than church liturgies, and more 
effective too” (145). Moreover, the love both expressed through God’s existence and imbued in 
human experience challenges, and eventually destroys, the oppressive barriers that arbitrarily sep-
arate human beings from one another. 
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This prompts the question, then, of why the Bible would speak out against oppressed queer 
people, whose experiences resemble so clearly the experiences of Christ and the nature of the 
divine. Ultimately, this is where rejection of heteronormative, systematic theology is crucial. Ra-
ther than refuting Biblical claims directly, Queer Christians focus instead on the Bible’s tendency 
towards contradiction. Deborah Jian Lee, author of Rescuing Jesus, argues that biblical literalism 
is inherently selective and inconsistent, used to “construct strict delineations between right and 
wrong—careful, of course, to place [those who employ it] on the right side” (71). This tendency 
towards rhetorical opportunism is also cited in The Bible as Literature: An Introduction, which 
analyzes the Bible as a heterogenous, multivariate work of literature, while nonetheless acknowl-
edging its social, cultural, and historical significance: “when using the Bible to provide proofs in 
religious arguments, […] readers always turn to those passages that support their own point of 
view and ignore those that do not. The well-known fact that even the Devil can quote scripture to 
his own purposes indicates the variety and multiplicity of this inexhaustible collection, for there is 
something here for all tastes” (Gabel & Wheeler 83). Both perspectives challenge the popular idea 
of the “closed canon” (82), not denying outright the homophobic and transphobic passages of the 
bible but instead questioning their significance amidst a larger narrative landscape—a landscape 
which is undoubtedly characterized by contradiction, collaboration, omission, and ambiguity. 
Biblical contradictions have, on the other hand, only further solidified Queer Christian 
faith. As openly gay Christian activist Brian Murphy describes, “the authors [of the Bible] were 
struggling to make sense of themselves, the world around them, and their relationship to something 
bigger than themselves […] That doesn’t make the Bible less true, it makes it more true” (par. 15). 
Murphy’s description of the Bible’s uncertain—or perhaps provisional—intent echoes one of 
queer theology’s essential tactics: “queer reason” (Cheng 16). This mode of reasoning, more 
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recently making use of poststructuralist philosophy and postcolonial theory, “challenge[s] not only 
the fluidity of sexual and gender boundaries, but also the boundaries relating to Christian theology 
itself [….] soul vs. body, life vs. death, heaven vs. earth, center vs. margins” (18). In this sense, 
queer reasoning is effectively a continuation of the struggle braved by the authors of the Bible. In 
the same sense that the Bible itself is human (Gabel & Wheeler xii), it is also alive via the exchange 
between itself and Queer Christians, who continue to search for themselves within its contents 
while nonetheless seeking their interpellation beyond present systematic theologies. 
Queering biblical narratives only strengthens these associations further. It is important to 
note that this does not entail altering these narratives by any means; rather, it is a tactic taken from 
the Bible itself. The Reverend Elizabeth Edman, highlighting a key point in her book Queer Virtue, 
argues that “Christianity persistently calls the followers of Jesus to rupture, or queer, false binaries 
that pit people against each other” (Edman par. 1). She uses “queer” to describe the act of debunk-
ing social norms we often take for granted; in the case of queer Christians, this involves queering 
religious texts to reveal false dividing lines—lines which are not limited to sexuality and gender. 
The story of Jesus himself, for instance, could be called queer in the ways he defies our expecta-
tions of reality. In his critical scholarship, “Rethinking the Western Body,” Gerard Loughlin recalls 
how “Christ’s body is transfigured, resurrected, ascended, [and] consumed. Born a male, he yet 
gives birth to the church; dead, he yet returns to life; flesh, he becomes food” (9). Kittredge Cherry, 
a retired lesbian pastor, points out not only how Jesus “had two fathers (God and his adoptive dad, 
Joseph),” but also how “Mary gave birth [to him] without having sex with a man” (Kuruvilla par. 
3). Without simple explanation, these biblical phenomena contradict general assumptions made 
regarding human beings and the world we inhabit. One could make the argument that these 
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passages are not meant to be taken literally, but to do so would be to simultaneously reject any 
literal interpretation of the Bible whatsoever. 
These core values and assumptions not only provide the foundation for the Queer Christian 
movement, but also hark back to Auden’s poetry of the late 30s and early 40s. By accounting for 
Auden’s respective views on homosexuality and Catholicism in both their relatedness and opposi-
tion to one another, as well as their tendency to be reconsidered and redefined by Auden continu-
ously, we can approach an understanding of each at a more fundamental level. Auden’s career, 
then, documents an unmistakably candid account of the twentieth-century tensions between ho-
mosexuality and religion, which are largely the result of norms set by overarching hegemonies. 
 
“LIKE A VOCATION”: SELFLESS COMPASSION AS REMEDY TO DEPARTURE 
 Above all else, “Like a Vocation” (1939) revolves around one’s overcoming their propen-
sity for self-interest; initially moving through time and space, the poem settles on observations of 
an unspecified, second-person subject who, although well-traveled and welcomed by many, strug-
gles to find permanency in their life. Their dormancy in this matter is thwarted unexpectedly by 
childlike crying, which throws them involuntarily into a compassionate state; we are left with a 
sense that, likely desiring to comfort the source of this crying, this second-person subject has made 
some sort of breakthrough in quelling their prior selfishness. Moreover, it is here that Auden ges-
tures towards the utility of Agapian love as a basis for overcoming self-interest, which could in 
turn bring about “community” in its most authentic sense. As we are informed almost immediately 
by the poem’s speaker, this community is unlike anything seen in prior history. 
In its first stanza, the speaker drops us in the midst of an unspoken conundrum: our speaker, 
engaged in a process of eliminating potential solutions to this conundrum, seems convinced that 
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the end goal must be brought about by means that are both particular and lasting. The first failed 
hypothesis comes in the form of “that dream Napoleon […] / Before whose riding all the crowds 
divide, / Who dedicates a column and withdraws” (Auden, “Like a Vocation,” 203). We are given 
a few clues as to why Napoleon, or perhaps his “dream,” has fallen through as a viable solution. 
First and foremost, the fact that Napoleon himself is characterized as a “dream” suggests an ethe-
reality to his vision; in other words, the fact that he himself (and by extension, his vision) exists 
outside of reality renders him unable to realize his goals. Of course, this depiction seems antithet-
ical to the popular image of Napoleon Bonaparte—conqueror and unifier of western Europe—that 
persists into the twenty-first century. The speaker, taking no interest in reconciling this disparity, 
introduces us to two other failures:  
Nor as that general favourite and breezy visitor 
To whom the weather and the ruins mean so much,  
Nor as any of those who always will be welcome,  
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Do not enter like that: all these depart. (203) 
The first failed visitor, the “breezy visitor,” receives an even briefer introduction and explication 
than Napoleon; unlike the latter, whose approach causes “the crowds” to “divide,” the breezy vis-
itor appears to have gained favor among those around them, yet their interest seems to lie more so 
in the inanimate and the sublime, perhaps explaining their visitation. On the other hand, the second 
visitor(s) (“those who will always be welcome”), while sharing some resemblance to the breezy 
visitor in their being welcomed unconditionally, remains more ambiguous in nature; they are not 
so much a single individual as an archetype of the peaceful, hospitable traveler. Again, unlike 
Napoleon, whose presence is welcomed purely out of fear, “those […] welcome[d]” elicit in others 
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a sense of trust that, for whatever reason, ceases to change or disappear—yet, strangely, it is this 
same acceptance that prevents them paradoxically from “entering.” What binds these three visitors, 
perhaps not so much in who they are but in what their actions represent, is revealed thereafter: “all 
these depart.” Indisputably, these visitors share the propensity to enter a space and have some 
memorable impact—yet their presences, along with the possible realities their presence may evoke 
(e.g. imperial unification, growing tourist networks), leave eventually. By way of the visitors’ 
similarities, we begin to approach an understanding of the speaker’s conundrum: in analyzing these 
visitors, the speaker appears to be searching for a mode by which to bring about a “permanency” 
unseen in human history. 
 The speaker interrogates this matter further in the following stanzas in what appears to be 
a revisiting of the “breezy visitor,” though this is not apparent at first. Through the lens of pleasure, 
particularly “the stranger’s right to pleasure” (203), the speaker addresses suddenly an uncertain 
“you,” all the while depicting a vivid collage of seemingly innocuous social interactions. Over the 
course of the stanza, this “you” is greeted with foreign knowledge, entreated with questions, and 
advanced upon flirtatiously—gestures which culminate in the revelation that “the mountains and 
the shopkeepers accept you / And all your walks be free” (203). These final lines appear at first to 
stand on their own, in association with but not subsuming the previous gestures—yet “mountains” 
may very well be a metaphorical stand-in for nation or community, as “shopkeepers” may pertain 
to residents of said community, or those who keep shop. In this vein, those who engage with our 
second-person subject are effectively the shopkeepers, and their community the mountains. Such 
are the circumstances of the breezy visitor, “that general favourite” who searches primarily for 
inanimate wonders while accepting passively the company of locals—they are consistently en-
gaged with, rather than the other way around. This onslaught of unsolicited attention is, in essence, 
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“the stranger’s right to pleasure,” though one would suspect that, with time, this attention would 
render the label “stranger” a misnomer. Indeed, the concluding lines of this stanza suggest no 
qualms with this sort of relationship, and if the stanza were to stand in isolation from the rest of 
the poem, the breezy visitor might stand as a viable candidate for the “permanency”—or, at the 
very least, as close to permanency as one might hope to reach—that the speaker is looking for. 
However, this assumption is challenged directly in the third stanza, as the speaker turns once again 
to the notion of reality. Like Napoleon’s so-called dream, the stranger’s cordial affairs with the 
locals “lead / Up to a bed that only looks like marriage” (204). Not to be taken literally, the “wed-
ding” of the stranger to the locals speaks nonetheless to the incomplete nature of their relationship; 
this is because their relationship is predicated solely upon pleasure. Not only this, but symbolic of 
this nascent relationship is the “bed,” which suggests temporary repose or a brief sexual encounter. 
Though the speaker concedes that “these have their moderate success” (204), which they capture 
momentarily in the preceding stanza, they insist that, without deeper cultivation, the stranger re-
mains just that: a stranger.  
A few key points of context in relation to Auden’s literary style and biography provide 
further insight to this section. First and foremost, while the depiction of the breezy visitor may be 
a vague invocation of the Romantic poet Lord Byron, the potential similarities between visitor and 
Auden himself are equally noteworthy; Auden’s lifelong travels—his immigration to the United 
States notwithstanding—included brief vacations and short-term “residencies” in places like Ger-
many, Iceland, China, Spain, Italy, and Austria. Traveling, for Auden, became not only a search 
for poetic inspiration, but also a search for home (Jenkins par. 8). The possibility for direct influ-
ence upon this character seems more likely when one considers the sheer, subjective tone of the 
second stanza, which reads almost ethnographically, capturing a small sample of local values, 
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interests, and mannerisms. Indeed, an interesting feature of Auden’s poetry of the early 1940s, 
acutely so in New Year Letter, is the utilization of subjectivity for the purposes of repenting (Dean 
448). More can be said of this; for instance, the speaker in “Like a Vocation” provides little in the 
way of a motivation for the breezy visitor’s travels, save for their interest in the inanimate—yet 
this too can be linked to Auden’s caution towards the aimless pursuit of passion. Like Eros, these 
inanimate wonders elicit an intensity of emotion by means of visual splendor, an effect which can 
be profound but possibly unproductive if left to its own devices. In other words, Auden may be 
invoking his own experiences via the breezy visitor, particularly as a way of grappling with erotic 
desires, and subsequent regret, that occasionally reared themselves during his travels. The presence 
of “marriage,” then, is by no means a coincidence: it stands as the closest thing to a viable solution 
in the way of permanency, not only in its ability to remedy the breezy visitor’s incompleteness vis-
à-vis their affinity “to pleasure,” but also to redirect Auden’s erotic desires towards something 
more substantial. 
 We glimpse this solution, along with its outcome, in the final stanza of the poem. Curiously, 
the speaker refers once again to a second-person subject, “you,” and describes the approach of a 
faint, childlike weeping. While its exact location remains unknown, the speaker insists that it has 
always been there, coming from “nowhere particularly unusual” (Auden 204), yet it “climbs to-
wards your life like a vocation” (204). If the subject in question remains the breezy visitor, this 
revelation may certainly come as a surprise. The breezy visitor’s fascination with the sublime, and 
their subsequent search for it in foreign lands, may equally be a search for a deeper, spiritual mean-
ing; therefore, the speaker’s implication that the “search” does not require extensive travel, nor the 
answer bound to anything remarkable, turns the breezy visitor’s quest on its head. Whether or not 
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this brings them recourse, this weeping, like Auden’s vision in 1933, demands both their attention 
and assistance: 
The one who needs you, that terrified 
Imaginative child […] 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
[…] knows he has to be the future and that only 
The meek inherit the earth, and is neither 
Charming, successful, nor a crowd […] (204) 
It is at this moment that we gain insight into our speaker’s goal, and the mode by which to achieve 
it. The situation at hand involves a child in need of guidance from someone (presumably a parental 
figure or someone from the preceding generation) who possesses more experience with the world. 
Specifically, this child must learn to embody meekness, as this is the precondition for “inherit[ing] 
the earth.” The speaker’s invocation of scripture (King James Bible, Matt. 5.5), alongside marriage, 
brings us closer to an understanding of their desired reality: it is a vision for humanity that can 
only begin to be understood in biblical terms, one that seems to involve a reconstitution of human 
behavior, to achieve a sort of quietude. Indeed, this notion is supported by the acute clamor of this 
stanza, flooded with noises of traffic, birds, crowds, and the bustle of summertime, all of which 
make the child’s weeping harder to discern. Equipped with this knowledge, however, the speaker’s 
vision is still left wanting. The vision, while certainly noble, remains abstract, conceived only by 
means of allusion and negation; in other words, we know what this vision is like (i.e., a Christian-
ized utopia) and what it is not like (it is not “charming,” like the breezy visitor; “successful,” like 
Napoleon; “nor a crowd,” like the mass of welcomed visitors). Our only possible indication as to 
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what the vision could be, literally, is marriage, as marriage embodies another critical aspect of this 
vision: permanency, or the propensity not to depart. 
 We can gain a bit more clarity by considering Auden’s own marriage in relation to the 
speaker’s envisioned reality. It should not be overlooked that this is one of a selection of poems 
that “he said had grown out of what he called ‘l’affaire C,’ his love for Chester” (Carpenter 262), 
and considering its composition just one month after meeting Kallman, it is very likely that this 
last stanza captures the spirit of their first meeting. I’ve touched briefly upon the recurrence of 
passivity throughout this poem (e.g., the breezy visitor’s tendency to be acted upon by those around 
him), as well as the fact that the child operates similarly to Auden’s vision of Agape. Indeed, 
Kallman’s emergence in Auden’s life was entirely unexpected, which he seems to have predicted 
in his poem of the early 1930s, “O tell me the truth about love”: “When it comes, will it come 
without warning / Just as I’m picking my nose?” (qtd. in Carpenter 259). These parallels suggest 
that Kallman had an equally evocative effect on Auden’s life, and the confidence with which his 
speaker touts the supremacy of marriage, whether as a direct solution to their conundrum or as a 
starting point, opens up the possibility that Auden is bringing hindsight to “Like a Vocation.” 
Indicative of this hindsight are the shortcomings of past efforts to bring about the speaker’s vision, 
as well as the speaker’s critiques of the breezy visitor. In other words, through the breezy visitor 
Auden may be critiquing his own interpersonal misconduct, the likes of which prevented him from 
thinking accurately about humanity’s broader mistakes. What can be said of these mistakes, and 
the methods by which to resolve them, may be found in the essence of the relationship between 
the breezy visitor and the child. Their relationship is nothing short of the compassion one might 
feel for a crying baby, and the breezy visitor’s desire to remedy such distress comes not from a 
place of self-interest—they are not seeking out the source of the crying, but rather it is seeking out 
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them—but from something less obvious, perhaps instinctive. As with their sparse descriptions of 
their vision, the speaker is unconcerned with defining the nature of the subject’s desire, but it is 
nonetheless “like a vocation”: it is like something divine but also not, yet it is nonetheless com-
manding and exigent. 
 
“LAW LIKE LOVE”: PRUDENT BOASTING & THE SEARCH FOR TRUE “LAW” 
While beginning in the affirmative, “Law Like Love” (1939) nonetheless resembles “Like 
a Vocation” in its observational, and eventually inquisitive, tone. “Law Like Love” is concerned 
primarily with voice and its potential consequences; noting a general trend among the masses to 
speak rather than listen—and more specifically, to draw assumptions rather than consider other 
possibilities—the speaker calls for a rhetorical ceasefire, recognizing that it is those same voices 
that so desperately search for righteousness that inadvertently drown it out. Yet, the speaker 
acknowledges their—as well as their romantic partner’s—complicity in this matter and their desire 
to change their ways, the speaker nevertheless boasts the ability of love in bringing all closer to 
that obscured truth (i.e., “Law”). Through this poem, Auden further elucidates the potentiality of 
love, as well as the union of love, in approaching a revolutionized alternative to the status quo or, 
as his speaker describes it, an “unconcerned condition.”  
In its first half, the speaker presents us with a series of claims regarding what the “Law is,” 
laying out for readers a definition (if it can truly be called that) that changes in accordance with its 
audience. The poem begins,  
Law, say the gardeners, is the sun, 
Law is the one 
All gardeners obey 
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To-morrow, yesterday, to-day. (Auden 208).  
Here we receive our first glimpse of what “Law” comprises, as well as its nature: from the obedi-
ence that the gardeners express across time to the sun, which is an embodiment of the Law, we can 
conclude that the Law not only holds singular, dictatorial power over its subjects, but also that it 
has always been this way. While this nature holds true as the poem continues, that which Law 
comprises changes. In the second stanza, the speaker introduces us to a generational dispute be-
tween the young and their ancestors:  
Law is the wisdom of the old, 
The impotent grandfathers feebly scold; 
The grandchildren put out a treble tongue 
Law is the senses of the young. (208) 
Several observations are of note here, first and foremost being that these claims about the Law are 
just that—claims, with no substantial evidence to back them save for subjective observation. Nat-
urally, those making such claims run the risk of fallibility, and while the speaker does not indicate 
outright that their claims are wrong, they gesture, nonetheless, in that direction. This is reflected 
in the pontifications of both generations, the claims of which appear to be in direct opposition to 
their more visible qualities: the grandfathers’ proclamations of unwavering authority seem anti-
thetical to their impotent, feeble bodies through which they deliver their claims, while the grand-
children’s youthful zeal, their “treble tongue,” may result in their overreaching and misinterpreting 
the world around them. Secondly, by way of suspected fallibility, our understanding of what the 
“Law is” is thrown into question. We have not only two but three groups making claims in the 
works (the gardeners, the grandfathers, and the grandchildren), and these will not be the last. With 
each claim comes a respective opinion informed by subjective experience, and the incongruity of 
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each claim, save for the nature of the Law, suggests that most, if not all, must be incorrect; this 
possibility, however, does not steer these groups towards caution in expressing their claims about 
the Law, favoring instead a sort of licentiousness of speech, the consequences of which are ex-
pounded in the succeeding stanza. 
 Law is explored thereafter at the institutional level, and it is here that the speaker begins to 
debunk many of these claims. Broadly, the speaker suggests that it is not so much these false claims 
that we should be concerned about in particular but rather the act of making claims to begin with. 
Discourses surrounding the Law have punctured places of worship and, perhaps not as surpris-
ingly, courts of law. We are greeted by two individuals in the third stanza, the priest and the judge, 
both of whom speak sanctimoniously to the group before them, perceiving them as subordinates. 
Illustrative of this relationship is the priest who, “with a priestly look, / Expounding to an unpriestly 
people,” claims that “Law […] / […] is the words in [their] priestly book, / Law is [their] pulpit 
and [their] steeple” (208). The priest’s clear position of authority is telling, in that it is likely a 
ruse; the insistence that the priest is truly “priestly,” via repetition of the word, in fact has the 
opposite effect, throwing their legitimacy into question. It seems more likely that this person em-
bodies priesthood which, coupled with their possessiveness towards the church, creates an aura of 
righteousness around them, which others are inclined to follow. A similar comment could be made 
of the judge, who quite literally positions himself above his audience, presumably from the bench: 
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose, 
Speaking clearly and most severely, 
Law is as I’ve told you before, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Law is The Law. (208) 
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The judge’s explanation of the Law lacks specificity, and this appears to be intentional; his ges-
tures—the condescending glare, the intonation of his voice, and his firm declaration—appear to 
be scare tactics disguised as generosity (he’s told his audience before, as he states, but he is willing 
nonetheless to repeat himself). In reality, his explanation garners nothing more than a petition for 
the status quo: “Law is the Law,” and therefore requires no further explication from himself or, in 
particular, from others. The judge may have divulged further details in the past, as he himself 
suggests, yet without any evidence for it, we are left to assume that his “non-explanation” is in fact 
a reinforcement of the Law’s authority, of which he is the arbiter. By way of these two individuals, 
the speaker is potentially expressing cynicism towards the act of making claims about the Law: 
what at first seems virtually harmless—at its worst, fostering petty resentment between generations 
over who is correct—becomes a gradual infiltration and perversion of positions of power. Further-
more, claims such as these are less interested in critical thought about the Law for some greater 
good and more inclined to obfuscate it for selfish ends. 
 The speaker further suggests that their reflections highlight a core issue in the act of making 
claims about the Law: it relies solely upon externalization and persuasion, rather than introspection 
and contemplation—in other words, speaking rather than listening. What follows a lengthy series 
of claims about the Law is the speaker’s proclamation that “Others say, Law is our Fate; / Others 
say, Law is our State; / Others say, others say” (208). In comparison to the claims aforementioned, 
the brevity of these newest claims suggest frustration on the part of the speaker, who appears more 
focused on drawing attention not to “Fate” and the “State” but to the act of vocalizing these ideas 
in the first place. Indeed, what “others say” has been the focal point of the poem thus far, and 
despite capturing the claims themselves, there are no moments in which those making claims are 
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in dialogue with their respective audience, choosing instead to plant this claim and let it blossom 
through blind persistence. This idea is echoed clearly in the following stanza: 
And always the loud angry crowd, 
Very angry and very loud, 
Law is We, 
And always the soft idiot softly Me. (208) 
We see again an emphasis on vocalization, vocalization which, here, seems to be driven primarily 
by passion or ignorance. Regarding both the “angry crowd” and the “soft idiot,” the speaker once 
again utilizes repetition to highlight some deeper irony. In the case of the “angry crowd,” their 
propensity to be “loud” and “angry” may quite literally bar them from hearing themselves, thus 
disabling their ability to reflect on their claims and potentially arrive at a clearer, more accurate 
position than before. Yet it is not the volume at which one speaks that denotes the false claim, as 
we see in the case of the “soft idiot” that even the faintest of claims can derail meaningful dialogue, 
and thus a deeper understanding of the Law. Moreover, the speaker pushes back against the act of 
making claims about the Law as a whole, since, based on their observations laid out thus far, 
making claims about the Law as a whole has only worked to obfuscate it and strengthen those who 
seek control and domination. Yet in rejecting this process, the speaker points to an alternative 
unspecified thus far, the likes of which they elucidate, or perhaps replicate, through the lens of a 
companion unmentioned thus far. 
 The remainder of “Law Like Love,” like the ventures of the breezy visitor in “Like a Vo-
cation,” feels utterly personal, reflecting a private interaction that may nonetheless provide insight 
in remedying ongoing, public miscalculations through the rejection of their outcomes. Directed to 
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their companion, the speaker draws parallels between themselves and those around them in regard 
to their equal understanding (or lack thereof) of the Law:  
[…] we, dear, know we know no more 
Than they about the Law, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Except that all agree 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
That the Law is […] (209) 
This concession may come as a surprise, given the speaker’s own tone of superiority heretofore, 
yet it remains in line with their emphasis on refraining from further conjecture. Nevertheless, the 
speaker’s hesitance to characterize the Law beyond its nature does not stop them from stating 
unequivocally that the “Law is.” Accompanying this assertion is a vague sense that something 
must be done, though whether that something pertains to defining the Law or not is unknown; thus, 
we are left speculating as to why, or what it is that prevents each individual, the speaker and their 
companion included, from “know[ing] what [they] should and should not do” (209). The intentions 
behind this ambiguity may be manifold; however, it has the effect of equalizing all involved in 
universal ignorance.  
This need to understand what must be done may, on the one hand, refer to the steps neces-
sary in perceiving and explicating precisely the Law and its effects, but it may also speak to the 
attitudes held by Auden himself in relation to the power structures that constituted the world 
around him in 1939. It is certainly power structures (specifically in the United States, but almost 
universally across the world) that, backed by de facto social policing, both discredited Auden’s 
relationship with Chester Kallman and prevented their legal marriage. This, however, did not stop 
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him from viewing their relationship as anything less legitimate than marriage, for, in the context 
of “In Sickness and in Health,” Gottlieb states that Auden acknowledged the inherent “doubleness” 
of marriage: “it can be both a legal institution and a moral commitment [and] the two need not 
overlap” (31). Nonetheless, Auden did not leave the legal institution of marriage unattended; in 
1935, prior to his immigration, Auden married the Jewish refugee Erika Mann, enabling her to 
secure British citizenship and subsequently flee Nazi Germany. Evidently, Auden “simply did not 
hesitate to exploit a legal formality that otherwise remained unavailable, even hostile to him. On 
the contrary, he even tried to create a kind of spontaneous institution, in which gay men would 
marry women threatened under fascist regimes” (Gottlieb 30). Such bold defiance of social expec-
tations can be found in “Law Like Love,” even in the context of conscious humility. The passage 
that follows the speaker’s declaration of a universal ignorance, and subsequent plea to reassess and 
reconsider the situation at hand, is surprisingly divergent from these concepts. Conceding once 
again, the speaker states, 
Although I can at least confine 
Your vanity and mine 
To stating timidly 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
We shall boast anyway: 
Like love I say. (Auden 209) 
This unexpected claim about what the Law is (that it is in fact “like love”) stands in total opposition 
to the speaker’s prior reticence, and would more or less upend the credibility they have built over 
the course of the poem if not for their prior forewarnings. Moreover, the presence of this contra-
diction bears a keen resemblance to Auden’s eagerness in transgressing, in more ways than one, 
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prescriptive expectations of marriage. This is made evident by the fact that he seems to be invoking 
his own marriage here; referring to the confining of “your vanity and mine,” it is difficult to ignore 
the similarities between “Law Like Love” and the poem Auden gave to Kallman on his twentieth 
birthday; in it, he alludes again to a shared sense of vanity: “In harness the Two are a fine combi-
nation / But a little too fond of the mirror” (qtd. in Farnan 27). Perhaps by no coincidence, the 
poem captures the spirit of “Law Like Love” in its regard for the shortcomings, but inherent po-
tential, of paired individuals as a model for progress. 
 The numerous similarities between “Law Like Love” and “Like a Vocation” should not be 
understated, not only in their symbolic adoption of marriage as a solution to the problem at hand, 
but also in a shared search for a reality that has yet to be realized. I have discussed previously the 
ways in which “Like a Vocation” operates as an interrogation of an imagined present that, at its 
core, is contingent upon the departure and division of individuals, as well as an exploration of 
“marriage,” analogous to selfless compassion, as a remedy to those divisions. While this pursuit is 
less transparent in “Law Like Love,” one particular remark from the speaker, delivered as part of 
his private reflections, is telling; explaining his reticence to describe the Law in comparison to 
others, he insists that 
No more than they can we suppress 
The universal wish to guess 
Or slip out of our own position 
Into an unconcerned condition. (Auden 209) 
It is interesting that, to achieve such an “unconcerned condition,” one must first be rid of their 
“position,” a term which fittingly remains open-ended, but in the context of the poem brings to 
mind both the perspectives that individuals hold in regard to the Law and its machinations, as well 
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as the “occupations” these individuals hold (gardeners, priests, judges). To “slip out,” therefore, 
requires one not only to relinquish their beliefs but also the social status that likely informs them, 
as both result indirectly in the chaos, and certainly division, throughout the poem. In the case of 
the grandfathers and grandchildren, for instance, the distinctions between, and concomitant expec-
tations of, “old” (wise, but frail) and “young” (sensible, but rash) categories foment disagreement 
between the two groups. On the other hand, the priest and the judge draw deliberate lines between 
themselves and their underlings, reinforcing their power through specious authority. Conversely, 
to slip out of such positions would be tantamount to casting off these constructed distinctions and, 
subsequently, to “equalize” humanity—a feat which the speaker is able to observe privately, in the 
form of general human ignorance about the Law, but can essentially do nothing with unless others 
follow suit. 
 
NEW YEAR LETTER: THE LONG & WINDING ROAD AHEAD 
Far longer than “Like a Vocation” and “Law Like Love,” New Year Letter (1940), ad-
dressed to Auden’s colleague, Elizabeth Mayer, is divided into three parts, each of which takes 
place on the last day of the year. The poem functions as an exploration of crises facing the world 
at large and the speaker personally; supposedly having succumbed to dark forces, both parties 
search desperately for a panacea that might turn the tides in their favor and bring about a state of 
genuine peace and cooperation. To the same degree that these conflicts are sensationalized, Auden 
writes didactically and with a striking degree of verisimilitude—his speaker, recognizing that hu-
man misconduct lies at the heart of these crises, depicts a rigorous mountain path analogous to the 
road that all must travel to bring humanity back to its natural state; as we will see, this natural state 
reflects their larger desire for “diversity in unity” (171). At the same time, the speaker hints that 
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this road also reflects their personal experience surrounding commitment; their romantic relation-
ship, while not blatantly propounded, is characterized equally by difficulties in the form of re-
peated error and miscalculation. Moreover, it is only through acceptance and reconsideration of 
these difficulties that true progress can come about, and the same could be said for the aforemen-
tioned trek towards the mountain’s summit. With regard to Auden’s larger conceptualizations, the 
poem serves as an expansion of the ideas expressed in the previous poems; his emphasis on the 
rigorous nature of positive progress—be it towards genuine love, community, or both—is not to 
suggest implausibility, rather it is to say that, like commitment (more specifically marriage in his 
case), it will often be as grueling as it is utterly lucrative. 
In a broad sense, Part One seeks to characterize the atmosphere of the New Year, as well 
as the conflict at hand. This is done by immediately thrusting readers onto the scene, wherein 
people appear to be both jovial (underscored by a sense of optimism directed towards the future) 
and apprehensive (acknowledging the possibility that the conflict may only worsen as time pro-
gresses). It should not come as a surprise at this point that the speaker refrains from delivering 
direct exposition regarding this conflict, though we are given vague explanations of its cause(s) 
and effects. The speaker notes their familiarity with such an atmosphere; a year prior, they recall 
their stay in Brussels during the New Year, remarking that  
the sleepless guests of Europe lay 
Wishing the centuries away, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
As on the verge of happening 
There crouched the presence of The Thing. (Auden 161) 
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This passage, while clearly evoking wartime anxieties over the prospect of German invasion (al-
most five months after the publication of New Year Letter, German forces would occupy Belgium 
until 1945), depicts “The Thing” as a lone creature that prefers to wait rather than take immediate 
action as a means of acquiring power. Allegedly, “all formulas were tried to still / [….] All bolts 
of custom made secure” (161) to prevent the entrance of The Thing, yet by means of subterfuge it 
somehow breached the city, “approaching every bedside all the same” (161). Equipped with total 
awareness of The Thing’s presence and taking every precaution they can muster, the city aston-
ishingly and, perhaps unknowingly, falls victim to the creature’s influence. Nevertheless, the ap-
prehension that the city expresses on the verge of the New Year suggests a partial awareness of 
this possibility—that, despite the concerted efforts of the city’s residents to fortify themselves 
against The Thing’s invasion, they may somehow remain entirely defenseless. 
In this vein, the speaker seems to possess an insight that the city does not, specifically 
regarding the essence of their adversary. According to the speaker, The Thing’s invasion is neither 
swift nor visible; rather, its greatest strength is its perniciousness. While in large groups it may risk 
discovery, “time can moderate his tone / When talking to a man alone,” and over time 
Suspended hatreds crystallize 
In visible hostilities, 
Vague concentrations shrink to take 
The sharp crude patterns generals make… (161) 
With this explanation in mind, it becomes rather clear as to why physical barriers fail to keep out 
The Thing, whose threat comes in the form of subtle, ideological reconstitution. The Thing resem-
bles a demagogue, sowing hatred by essentializing or extremifying his target’s thought processes. 
Indeed, this is expressed via the oxymoronic “sharp crude patterns,” which suggest that the target’s 
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thoughts are clear-cut and direct yet unrefined and rudimentary; in this way, the target becomes a 
“general” itself, capable of making sweeping, impassioned statements about reality which are 
nonetheless off-base (perhaps alluding to those making claims throughout “Law Like Love”) and 
underscored by disdain for diversity. What The Thing accomplishes via ideological reconstitution 
is diversion; his targets become vessels through which he may fabricate scapegoats to prevent his 
own discovery, leading to widespread suspicion and paranoia. Embodying the helplessness felt in 
Brussels a year prior, the speaker exclaims, “O Who is trying to shield Whom? / Who left a hairpin 
in the room? / [….] / How did a snake get in the tower?” (165). Enlisting aid from local authorities 
proves to be useless, as they too are divided, specifically by factionalism and desperate self-inter-
est: 
The rival sergeants run about 
But more to squabble than find out, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
To one inspector dressed in brown, 
He makes the murderer whom he pleases 
And all investigation ceases. (165) 
Having infiltrated the ranks of the community’s protectors, The Thing appears to have succeeded 
in its endeavor. In service to this creature, whose true motives remain unclear, these negligent 
authorities cast off fully their social responsibilities in search of mindless distraction. Despite this 
preponderance of corruption, there appears to be no discernible mode by which to trace it to its 
starting point. The speaker identifies The Thing as the source of the problem, but their desire to 
know where the creature’s pursuit began surpasses their yearning to vanquish The Thing itself; 
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this suggests that the “solution”—not only to the corruption, but to an ever-increasing atmosphere 
of distrust—lies in ideological reconstitution from within, not without. 
 What also emerges throughout Part One, in a similar fashion to “Like a Vocation” and 
“Law Like Love,” is an express desire to bring about a reality that has yet to be seen in human 
history. Identifying a universal need “to set in order” (162), the speaker concedes nonetheless that 
“order can never be willed / [….] For will but wills it opposite” (162), alluding perhaps to those 
failed attempts at achieving the vision described in “Like a Vocation,” and the elusive “Law” in 
“Law Like Love.” Even in the context of the “Law” in “Law Like Love,” Linda Ross Meyer’s 
analysis provides insight here: “we call for it, it calls to us, be we cannot ‘have’ it [….] to have 
Law and control Law would be to take the lawfulness (the justice) out of it” (444). The same could 
be said for “the order,” which  
In intention all are one, 
Intending that their wills be done 
Within a peace where all desires 
Find each in each what each requires, 
A true Gestalt where indiscrete 
Perceptions and extensions meet. (Auden 162) 
Here, the emphasis placed on “intention” and “desire” suggests that it is these dispositions, rather 
than the literal order which they are in pursuit of, that will bring about the “true Gestalt”; order, 
then, is not governance bestowed upon a geographically defined community, but a voluntary meas-
ure in which one conducts oneself in accordance with the needs of others. Given that these inten-
tions must be ubiquitous across society to bring about this reality, this becomes a grandiose 
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undertaking which the speaker themselves grapples rigorously with in finding a model through 
which others may learn to do the same. 
 As with the previous two poems, the speaker once again assesses potential models, or po-
tential courses of action, that may befit their vision; here, they reason that Art, in its broadest sense, 
possesses some advantages but is ultimately ineffectual in this matter for various reasons. They 
speak plainly in their belief that “Art is not life and cannot be / A midwife to society” (162), 
insisting first that “Art in intention is mimesis” (162); in other words, despite conscious efforts to 
mirror reality, making art results in abstraction. In making this claim, the speaker seems to dispel 
the utopic qualities surrounding their vision, insisting that it must be as mundane as the means by 
which it is obtained. Art also fails in that it is a “fait accompli,” and since “Life-order comes to 
living men / It cannot say, for it presents / Already lived experiences” (162). We see yet another 
of Auden’s speakers taking issue with the tendencies of others—here, by way of their creations—
“to say,” and thus to direct their listeners. Finally, and perhaps the most telling in the way this 
vision must come to fruition, is that it is inherently subjective and therefore moving perpetually 
towards simplification: 
[…] each particular artist knows, 
Unique events that once took place 
Within a unique time and space, 
In the new field they occupy,  
The unique serves to typify, 
Becomes, though still particular, 
An algebraic formula, 
An abstract model of events… (162) 
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In other words, inasmuch as the speaker’s vision is real and must therefore reflect reality, it must 
also be specific to an everchanging temporal plane. The contradictory nature of the poem, being a 
mode of art itself, should also be apparent by now. If New Year Letter possesses an intention of its 
own—which by the speaker’s terms it must—it appears to be a call to action, a petition for a 
collective change of course in search of their new vision. Certainly, the speaker does not dismiss 
the utility of art entirely. The “particulars” mentioned above, for instance, are valuable in that they 
enable hindsight and reconsideration on both the artist’s and observer’s part; equipped with this 
understanding, “Like a Vocation” and “Law Like Love” seem keenly aware of this function, at 
once considering the particulars of each poem’s respective past and present while also standing as 
a particular itself, ready to be dissected by future generations of readers. Indeed, we receive such 
particulars in this poem as well; the speaker, for instance, goes to great lengths in illustrating a 
“summary tribunal” (163) consisting of key writers throughout history, ranging from Catullus, to 
William Blake, to Rainer Maria Rilke. These figures, embodying in death the standing of “great 
masters” (163), function not simply as a source of inspiration for the speaker but also a benchmark 
through which to judge the speaker’s own work and actions. Their position in the speaker’s life is 
constant, and while their influence is “considerate and mild and low” (163), their weighing pres-
ence over time prompts the question, “who can show convincing proof / That he is worthy of their 
love?” (164). In capturing this intimate moment of introspection in writing, the poem delivers a 
distinct vantage point at a given time in history which nonetheless speaks to ubiquitous aspects of 
the human experience (e.g., moments of vulnerability and uncertainty). 
Nevertheless, this still does not completely answer the question of intent, given that there 
are certainly other, more rhetorical elements at work. On the one hand, the poem’s adherence to 
subjectivity seems itself rhetorical. Patrick Deane remarks, “the solipsistic experience of reading 
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such a work is paradoxically at the root of whatever efficacy the text may eventually enjoy in 
history and in human affairs outside of literature,” and further states that the conscious effort “be-
tween one subject and another reading, turns out indeed to be […] a way in which an author can—
albeit obliquely—make something intentional ‘happen’” (184). The oblique nature of this “some-
thing” seems purposeful as well, as the speaker expresses time and again their uncertainty over 
where to begin, how to instigate change in the correct way, and how to overcome the unrest they 
face within themselves. While these concerns appear to be genuinely felt, they also function as an 
acknowledgment of change; implicitly aware that the vision itself, along with the means of ap-
proaching it, may change shape, the speaker vaguely conceptualizes the vision as a means of 
preservation, allowing others to connect their own search across time and space. Approaching the 
conclusion of this first part, the speaker emphasizes this point: “truth, like love and sleep, resents 
/ Approaches that are too intense” (Auden 166). This appears to be an extension, or perhaps a 
revision, of sorts, of the logic expressed in “Law Like Love,” which emphasizes conscious reti-
cence over boisterous debate. Here, the speaker advocates not for a default silence, but rather for 
prudent discourse; it is not so much a resignation to “boast anyway” (209), but an acceptance that 
speculation holds the potential to provide any measure of insight. Potentiality, rather than certainty, 
is key here, as the speaker finishes Part One:  
“This private minute for a friend,  
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Be under Flying Seal to all 
Who wish to read it anywhere, 
And, if they open it, En Clair. (167). 
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In Part Two, we witness the sudden emergence of “The Devil” (171), whom the speaker 
depicts in a surprisingly human light. Like the Thing, this Devil engages similarly in psychological 
manipulation for the purposes of forging a “false association” in the minds of men: he links “Truth 
with a lie, then demonstrate[s] / The lie and [the men] […] in truth’s name, / Treat babe and bath-
water the same” (171). This process is merely a catalyzed account of the Thing’s pernicious influ-
ence, wherein individuals are persuaded unknowingly to invert their values to suit the creature’s 
interest. The speaker’s concern as to how this could happen without arousing suspicion receives 
an explanation here: it is not so much that one’s perception of “Truth” is obscured or reconstituted, 
but rather it is the means by which one believes Truth will be obtained that undergoes change. The 
subtlety of these malicious efforts only serves to increase anxieties surrounding this crisis, yet 
despite the Devil’s successes, his efforts are fraught with difficulties of their own: 
For as the great schismatic who 
First split creation into two 
He did what it could never do, 
Inspired it with the wish to be 
Diversity in unity […] (171) 
In other words, his method of dividing others has succeeded in sowing isolation and hatred; how-
ever, these persistent divisions only intensify human desires for a natural coexistence among all. 
As the speaker states, this desire is not bent on a desire for uniformity—an attempt to do so would 
likely result in the failures expounded in “Like a Vocation”—but rather for heterogeneity. Therein 
lies another error on the Devil’s part: his attempts to obscure and divide humanity only serve to 
create more “dualities” within it, thus driving his vision of all-encompassing domination further 
towards the realm of impossibility. In effect, his goals become, like the speaker’s own, a vision 
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that distorts the more one tries to grasp it. Tellingly, “diversity in unity” becomes the only viable 
option for the Devil and the speaker alike in this scenario. It is the only mode by which both can 
come close to their respective visions: the Devil, in that his vision of supremacy is impossible and 
will only be an approach, bent on division, at best; and the speaker, in that their vision of Truth is 
universally inclusive, indiscriminatory, and voluntary. 
 The Devil’s human-like qualities—his fallible reasoning, as well as his need for a unified 
diversity—place him in close association with humanity at large. Indeed, the speaker suggests that 
the Devil’s presence does not merely distract and corrupt individuals; rather, he serves as a reflec-
tion of humanity’s destructive tendencies. The devastation that the Devil has waged throughout 
the poem is weakened momentarily in one stanza, wherein the speaker declares that his presence 
is an embodiment “Of fear and faithlessness and hate / That takes on from becoming me / A legal 
personality” (169). By depicting the Devil in mundane, emotionally fervent terms, we receive an 
account of this crisis that places more direct responsibility on the person rather than on clandestine 
forces beyond human control. The speaker once again employs subjective experience in charac-
terizing themselves as taking on such a state. It should also be mentioned that, in becoming a “legal 
personality,” they are also voicing their skepticism towards a global trend towards modernity and 
rationalism; in part three, we witness the speaker pivot from their ideological formulations to de-
liver a lengthy exposition regarding “the Renaissance Man,” who “feel[s] in splendid isolation / 
[….] In the closed cab of Occupation” (184). Like the Devil, he too achieves “half-success” (184) 
in his attempts at promulgating reason and economy, yet in the end he “[dies] hated and alone” 
(185). Nonetheless, without proper vigilance from the public, these values proliferate even after 
the man’s death, ultimately leading to an unfamiliar reality: 
Whichever way we turn, we see 
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Man captured by his liberty, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Boys trained by factories for leading 
Unusual lives as nurses, feeding 
Helpless machines, girls married off 
To typewriters, old men in love 
With prices they can never get 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Children inherited by slums 
And idiots by enormous sums. (185-86) 
Here, the speaker depicts a crisis of humanity in similar terms to the crisis contrived by the Devil; 
the difference here, however, is that this crisis is grounded in a specific context surrounding eco-
nomic inequality, sustained by widespread complicity with a corrupt status quo. Furthering this 
section’s subjectivity is the potential that these derisions reflect Auden’s political views at this 
particular moment in time; as Deane highlights in his critical analysis on New Year Letter, while 
Auden disavowed Communism as a viable method to bring about the future he envisioned in 1939, 
he nonetheless did not “cease to hold the political views he had held before that date” (177), yet 
the poem refrains from the supposedly propagandistic methods of the English Auden. The signif-
icance of all this is that, in depicting a subjective, temporally specific crisis, the sensational crisis 
expressed in New Year Letter which pits the Devil against humanity is rendered allegorical. By 
way of this subjectivity, humanity’s true adversary becomes itself, the Devil being just one partic-
ular “mode of thought” (183) through which to understand it. Yet, in becoming one’s own worst 
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enemy, humanity is also equipped with the knowledge, informed by that sense of isolation and 
self-interest, that change is necessary. 
 The speaker is careful to emphasize the sheer difficulty of fighting back against the divisive 
trends plaguing humanity. Their earlier considerations surrounding the shortcomings of art in 
bringing forth “Truth” are expanded to include those of language itself. Having previously re-
marked that “language may be useless, for / No words men write can stop the war” (166), they 
interrogate this matter further: 
If in this letter that I send 
I write ‘Elizabeth’s my friend,’ 
I cannot but express my faith 
That I is not Elizabeth. (169) 
In this vein, the speaker is suggesting that the very nature of language itself is based on delineation, 
and therefore division. The use of pronouns to distinguish between the speaker and their friend, 
Elizabeth, puts the two at a certain distance from one another—a distance which the speaker takes 
interest in, particularly regarding what might be possible if this distance is bridged. Yet with these 
considerations of language in tow, the speaker’s vision of unity becomes antithetical to some of 
the most basic elements of cultural experience. While the speaker does not deny that language 
imparts division, this does not discourage them in their endeavor, claiming instead that “our best 
protection is that we / In fact live in eternity” (169), stating further that “The sleepless counter of 
our breaths [….] / Has no direct experience / Of discontinuous events” (169). Above all else, this 
passage seeks to challenge constructed notions of divisions by suggesting that “eternity” exists 
outside the reach of human experience and is therefore unaffected by attempts to interfere with it. 
Conversely, all human experience exists within eternity, and for this reason all human experience 
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shares a genuine connection. Moreover, this elucidates the speaker’s additional claim that “all our 
intuitions mock / The formal logic of the clock” (169). Here, the speaker pits “time”—itself another 
cultural notion—against inherent “intuitions,” implying by their “mocking” that they exist in the 
realm of some instinctual truth ubiquitous to humankind. This distinctly metaphysical mode of 
thought, while suggestive of some large-scale overhaul of culture, exists only to emphasize hu-
manity’s natural inclination towards Truth; indeed, it is true that the Devil’s mischief has granted 
humanity “half-truths” (176) by way of his False Association, suggesting their relative proximity 
to the whole Truth. The speaker proposes that humanity synthesize these half-truths, and therein  
lies the gift of double focus,  
The magic lamp which looks so dull 
And utterly impractical  
Yet, if Aladdin use it right, 
Can be a sesame to light. (176) 
This passage suggests a method by which to achieve “diversity in unity,” particularly in synthe-
sizing fragments of truth with other people. It is—as we have seen in the previous poems—a “so-
lution” based around mundanity and gradual progress: the stipulation that the lamp must be used 
correctly makes the possibility of this solution rather conditional, and at its best it will function as 
a microscopic avenue through which to arrive at Truth. Yet the utility of “double focus” may, in 
fact, be the most viable candidate for the speaker in bringing about human progress in its most 
plausible sense. 
 The implications of “double focus,” particularly in the context of marriage, are elucidated 
in the third part of the poem. This, however, is preceded by an important allusion to, and subse-
quent reconsideration of, Auden’s vision of Agape. Parallel to his vision in 1933, the speaker 
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experiences their own vision spontaneously and in the company of others. Describing this vision 
as an “unexpected power” (177), they proceed, “Each felt the placement to be such / That he was 
honoured overmuch” (177). While the speaker emphasizes a feeling of unwavering certainty, or a 
sensation that all is apparently right in this particular moment, we do not receive the finer details 
of this sensation. While on the one hand this highlights the speaker’s general hesitance in putting 
forth definitions of such an experience—as they state much earlier regarding the interpretation of 
art, “each life must itself decide / To what and how it be applied” (162)—it also captures the 
speaker’s concerns in over-sensationalizing this experience, thereby rendering it inaccessible to a 
general audience. Reflecting further on this experience, the speaker notes that this experience is 
relatively common:  
O but it happens every day 
To someone. […] 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
[…] anytime, how casually, 
Out of his organized distress 
An accidental happiness […] (177) 
Moreover, while this sensation appears to be happenstance, triggered by even the most ordinary 
circumstance, its effects are still powerful, serving as a glimpse into “Eternal Innocence” (177) 
wherein true “diversity in unity” might be achieved. The speaker is quick to highlight that this 
sensation’s purpose is to make the individual “re-aware” (178); it functions as a blissful reminder 
of what could be, but its resemblance to that prospective future is not that future in and of itself. 
Therefore, “man must eat it and depart / At once with gay and grateful heart” (178); in other words, 
man must appreciate but not bask in this unexpected moment of passion, for it serves to reinstate 
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their convictions. Indulging in this moment—as with pursuits of Truth that are apparently too di-
rect—runs the risk of squandering this moment entirely, leaving one with a feeling of disappoint-
ment once it is gone.  
Furthermore, the speaker delivers a vision that both builds upon the claims of the prior 
poems as well as Auden’s 1933 vision—it is a vision that, despite its upheaving qualities, is utterly 
commonplace and brief. The vision, too, is subjective; as the speaker states, their own envisioned 
future is merely “a given mode of thought” (183). In a characteristic moment of self-conscious 
boasting, they nonetheless elaborate on this mode: 
No matter where, or whom I meet, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Whenever I begin to think 
About the human creature we 
Must nurse to sense and decency, 
An English area comes to mind […] (182) 
Interspersed throughout this passage are lucid descriptions of the speaker’s travels, as well as rec-
ollections of his youth in England, both of which for obvious reasons draw inspiration from Au-
den’s life. These passages are not meant to be self-aggrandizing, nor are they to suggest that other 
visions must embody the qualities as the speaker’s visions. Instead, their existence in the poem is 
a matter of practicality, particularly by forging potential connections with future generations of 
readers; as Deane puts it, shifting out of focus from “the historically specified recipient of the 
letter, onto the unspecifiable reader who will encounter the poem at some uncertain point in his-
tory, we see that the gospel of process […] will to some extent still be available to a reader even 
after conventional interpretation has become problematized by the alteration of historic 
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circumstances” (192). In other words, these passages effectively safeguard a particular mode of 
thought amidst a particular historical moment, which can be retrieved by future readers in the 
poem’s larger effort to “[make] something intentional ‘happen’” (184) beyond its literary confines. 
 Given the centrality of subjective experience in New Year Letter, in large part inspired by 
the poet’s own, it is not erroneous to suggest that Auden’s marriage informs the speaker’s ex-
pressed mode of thinking. One particular passage in the poem’s final stanza stands out amongst 
the rest; addressing Elizabeth Meyer directly, the speaker implores her, “bless / Me with your 
learned peacefulness,” so that they might emit “a warmth throughout the universe” and the 
knowledge “that each for better or for worse / Must carry round with him through life, / A judge, 
a landscape, and a wife” (193). The images of the “judge” and “landscape” are relatively familiar: 
earlier, the speaker describes the pursuit of the vision as akin to lifelong mountaineering, wherein 
upward movement is almost always grueling and prolonged, and the path is often lost; in this 
scenario, the “judge” might serve as our imperfect guide—or perhaps even the tribunal from Part 
One—and the “landscape” the summit that seems perpetually out of reach. This “wife,” however, 
is a novel concept within the confines of the poem, though we have certainly seen allusions to love 
and relationships in the poems discussed previously. It is very possible that Auden is invoking his 
own marriage in this passage, referring to Kallman as a “wife” in this context to suppress the 
homosexual nature of their relationship. While his concern for marriage appears to be a footnote 
in relation to the wider themes present throughout the poem, the professions of love expressed by 
the speakers in the previous poems offer potential insight when compared to New Year Letter. 
Akin to Gottlieb’s analysis of “In Sickness and in Health,” the speakers in these poems, “while 
identifiable, [are] nevertheless anonymous; [their voices], while sober, [are] nevertheless other-
worldly” (37); yet at the same time, despite this otherworldliness, they “[make] no distinction 
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between a higher realm inhabited by the Great and the lower sphere of ordinary life” (36). Indeed, 
we witness this in “Like a Vocation,” wherein the titular vocation evokes selfless compassion in 
the second-person subject against the unremarkable backdrop of a cityscape; and in the case of 
“Law Like Love,” the speaker exclaims their belief that their romantic love resembles the Law, 
yet in the same breath they voice its inherently vain and imperfect qualities. From these excerpts, 
we receive a concept of love, and by extension marriage, that is deeply important to the speakers 
despite its ordinary nature. 
 In the context of love and marriage, particularly regarding the declaration that one must 
“carry round with him through life […] / […] a wife” (Auden 193), the aforementioned “double 
focus” takes on an entirely different meaning. This “wife,” and by extension marriage, becomes 
the means by which the speaker obtains “double focus.” Unsurprisingly given Auden’s previous 
depictions of love, the speaker protests the idea of marriage at first directly to Meyer: “may the 
truth / That no one marries lead my youth / Where you already are” (193). The implication here is 
that Meyer has already married, and despite the speaker’s previous apprehension regarding mar-
riage, they suddenly and unexpectedly find themselves in the same position. Auden has made clear 
delineations between “Truth” and “truth” in this poem, and here we see the latter emerge, suggest-
ing that his speaker has gained hindsight in matters related to marriage; in other words, they have 
cast off their previous beliefs that marriage, too, is dull and impractical, yet they still need guidance 
in order to sustain that belief indefinitely. Thus, the speaker links cautiously their “wife” amidst 
larger efforts to achieve their vision, and this spirit of fragile certainty undergirds much of the third 
part of the poem. For instance, in conceptualizing a way towards their vision, the speaker acknowl-
edges their propensity to make mistakes along the way and the consequences those mistakes might 
have—and yet they declare, 
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Whatever wickedness we do 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
We can at least serve other ends, 
Can love the polis of our friends 
And pray that loyalty may come 
To serve mankind’s imperium. (180) 
Here, the speaker confesses that those in search of this ultimate “imperium” (be it a collective or 
the union between the speaker and their “wife”) might fail in their own lifetimes to bring it about, 
yet they still stand to make meaningful differences in the lives of those closest to them; perhaps, 
the speaker suggests, such a microcosm can become a model for the world at large. Viewed through 
the lens of marriage, on the other hand, “wickedness” may refer not only to the human capacity 
for error, but also the moral repugnancy that homosexuality was, and certainly still is, associated 
with. While it is true that Auden’s own views on homosexuality wavered, this passage suggests 
that if same-sex marriage is inherently wicked, the harm it can supposedly inflict pales in compar-
ison to the good that can come from it. The speaker expresses similar righteousness following their 
mountaineering allegory; in what serves as a blessing to this uphill journey, that speaker exclaims, 
O once again let us set out, 
Our faith well balanced by our doubt, 
Admitting every step we make 
Will certainly be a mistake, 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
And keep in order, […] 
.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Bisson 51 
 
A reverent frivolity […] (179) 
Again, while this call for cautious determination applies to any and all measures heading in the 
direction of Truth, they also function like marital vows. As discussed previously, the speaker in 
“Law Like Love” demonstrates a keen awareness of their, as well as their partner’s, vain tenden-
cies, the likes of which pose a threat in preserving their relationship. This awareness equips the 
speaker with a certain wariness that is extended here; in equal measure the speaker of New Year 
Letter expresses faith and doubt, yet their awareness—perhaps amplified by their “double focus”—
enables them to both identify their miscalculations and reassess previous strategies. Essentially, 
this awareness becomes their primary mode of defense against adversity, not only in the form of 
“the Devil” but also largescale pressures that deem their marriage to be deplorable and nonexistent. 
Additionally, this call for “reverent frivolity,” the likes of which appear later in “In Sickness and 
in Health,” applies to marriage itself, particularly in its “double” nature; as Gottlieb states, “the 
combination of seriousness and frivolity is doubtless due, in part, to the doubleness of marriage 
itself: it can be both a legal institution and a moral commitment, and the two need not overlap” 
(31). 
 
“IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH”: THE UTILITY OF MARRIAGE 
“In Sickness and in Health” (1940), beginning with its title, serves as Auden’s most direct 
reference to marriage of these four works. Amidst a state of calamity similarly found in New Year 
Letter, the speaker parses among other things the presence of Eros, the pervasiveness of which has 
served to blot out its Agapian counterpart, contributing further to the “shadow [cast] through the 
universe” (Auden 247). Linked closely to this concern is a recitation of the flaws present in the 
speaker’s romantic relationship; again, we see the speaker embracing these shortcomings and, in 
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a sense, sanctifying them “arbitrarily” through the institution of marriage. Ultimately, it is here 
where Auden’s larger concepts begin to align with one another: marriage becomes both the model 
and mode by which the speaker, along with their partner, will pave the way forward via an out-
pouring of love. 
The first stanza of “In Sickness and in Health” functions in many ways as a re-visitation 
and consolidation of the themes of the last three poems, signaling that the speaker’s concerns re-
volve around those issues and goals aforementioned. Addressing an unspecified individual, the 
speaker begins, “Dear, all benevolence of fingering lips / That does not ask for forgiveness is a 
noise / [….] To serve some glittering generalities” (247). The presence of “fingering lips,” which 
suggests an eloquence (and perhaps duplicity) of speaking, feels keenly reminiscent of the “treble 
tongue” of grandsons found in “Law Like Love,” the likes of which also made similar generalities 
in search of the one true “Law.” This search is certainly driven by the assumption of benevolence, 
but perhaps also righteousness; for such reasons, to avoid forgiveness—which, as we have seen in 
New Year Letter, is an acknowledgment of one’s propensity to be wrong and commit wrongdo-
ing—is to preclude genuine progress. The “noise” that results from this miscalculation appears to 
have an exponential effect, as the speaker states,  
Now, more than ever, we distinctly hear 
The dreadful shuffle of a murderous year 
And all our senses roaring as the Black 
Dog leaps upon the individual back. (247) 
Further comparisons can be drawn to the previous poems. First and foremost, the presence of noise 
(the “dreadful shuffle”) has, in a sense, been building up from poem to poem; with respect to “Like 
a Vocation,” we witness the partial muffling of the child’s crying by the bustle of the city, and in 
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breadth “Law Like Love” stands as a cacophony of competing voices. It is this same proliferation 
of noise that renders individuals vulnerable to the ominous “Black Dog,” who, like “The Thing” 
in New Year Letter, seems to favor a clandestine, gradual approach in targeting its prey. All of this 
is to say that the same elements of the works discussed previously appear to be at work here, most 
likely for the purposes of synthesis. Moreover, New Year Letter finds itself swept up in the same 
dilemmas and looking towards the same viable solutions to remedy them. 
 Indeed, almost as an extension of the ideas professed in “Law Like Love,” the poem puts 
forth “Love” as such a solution by positioning it in direct opposition to the dilemmas facing the 
speaker’s reality. On the one hand, Love is under fire by the combined force of noise and covert 
malice: “What figures of destruction unawares / Jump out on Love’s imagination” (247). The am-
biguous diction of this passage indicates the speaker’s persistent uncertainty, serving as both an 
exclamation of horror at the identifiable “figures” (e.g., the “noise,” which unbeknownst to itself 
causes further harm the more it presents itself) as well as a desperate longing to know those which 
are not clearly “identifiable” (e.g., “the Black Dog,” who relies on mass sensory overload to remain 
hidden, as well as the source of the “noise”). Yet, even in its perpetually desecrating state, the 
speaker insists that reclaiming “Love’s imagination,” specifically by spreading Love itself, is an 
extremely delicate and painstaking process. Voicing familiar caution, the speaker insists, “Let no 
one say I Love until aware / What huge resources it will take to nurse / One ruining speck, one 
tiny hair” (247). Thus, we return to a scenario in which, akin to the mountaineering journey of 
New Year Letter, the individual sets out on a grueling, virtually endless path towards their vision, 
which in this case is the “imagination” brought forth by Love. That desire “to nurse,” mimicking 
the unexpected compassion found in “Like a Vocation,” drives this individual forward in spite of 
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the difficulties before them. Also at odds with this endeavor is the current state of the world, as the 
speaker describes it: 
We are the deaf immured within a loud 
And foreign language of revolt, a crowd 
Of poaching hands and mouths who out of fear 
Have learned a safer life than we can bear. (247) 
Here, the speaker seems to link the present sensory overload of the masses to a kind of anxious 
self-interest. This behavior is antithetical to human nature as, according to the speaker, it denies 
the default inclination of humans to exhibit empathy and compassion for even the most remote 
strangers. There remain, however, instances in which this inclination pierces through this “foreign 
[…] revolt,” as in the case of the second-person subject in “Like a Vocation,” whose desire to 
respond to a child’s crying “climbs towards [them]” (204) despite the blaring noises of the city. 
This small instance elucidates Love’s authentic form in accordance with the poem, as well as the 
difficulties in enacting that authentic Love amidst an environment that concertedly, yet unknow-
ingly, pushes back against it.  
 Akin to its romantic themes, the poem also parses the relationship between erotic and 
Agapian love, finding that an imbalance has occurred between these two forces that is perpetuated 
by the dilemmas at hand. In the same way that the speaker’s reality operates under the auspices of 
a “foreign language,” they remark that “Nature by nature in unnature ends” (247), suggesting that 
humanity’s attempt to define reality, or more specifically to define what constitutes “nature,” only 
drives it further from what is truly natural. This process of defining nature may not be deliberate, 
but rather one’s sense of what is natural, and by extension what is normal, may be reinstated by an 
immobile fixation on the present, driven by the aforementioned need for safety. It is this rigid 
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existence that not only disables one’s ability to think beyond their material environment—perhaps 
achieving that “imagination” instilled by Love—but also binds them to a limited repertoire of hu-
man interaction and expression. Such a hindrance bars Agapian love (i.e., love that is selfless and 
compassionate) and leaves room only for the erotic. This development seems to have been hinted 
throughout literary history; for instance, we witness “Tristan, Isolde, the great friends, / Make 
passion out of passion’s obstacles, / Deliciously postponing their delight” (247), and “Don Juan, 
so terrified of death” “must find / Angels to keep him chaste” (247). In each of these scenarios, 
these characters apparently succumb wholeheartedly to the erotic, their reasoning having to do 
with fear and entrapment. In the case of Tristan and Isolde, their desperation for real passion en-
tices them not to seek it out but to prefer the obstacles to that passion themselves, while Don Juan, 
rather than confront his own anxieties, chooses instead to exploit feminine innocence (i.e. “An-
gels”) as a means of protection. Moreover, these depictions are telltale signs that “Eros is politi-
cally adored” (248), and “New Machiavellis, flying through the air, / [….] Murder their last vo-
luptuous sensation / All passion in one passionate negation” (248). These remarks are reminiscent 
of the speaker’s skepticism towards “the Renaissance Man” in New Year Letter, particularly in its 
promulgation of occupation, rationality, and subsequently, isolation. Here, similar skepticism is 
directed towards Machiavellian behavior, of which self-interest and emotional unavailability are 
characteristic. In the case of these “New Machiavellis,” total resignation to the erotic—perhaps 
out of fear or stubborn refusal to pursue anything greater—is tantamount to murder. In other words, 
while the speaker’s reality is averse to Agapian love, the act of fully succumbing to the erotic—
thus giving up on recovering Agape entirely—has the effect of squandering the value of Eros as 
well. Moreover, this is not necessarily a critique in which Agape is positioned as overtly superior 
to its counterpart, suggesting the possibility that the two may be in balance with one another. 
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 This is important to keep in mind when considering the speaker’s personal investment in 
this reality, which comes in the form of an incipient marriage. Herein, the speaker in a familiar 
tone addresses their partner directly and unabashedly: “beloved, we are always in the wrong, / 
Handling so clumsily our stupid lives, / Suffering too little or too long” (248). The admittedly 
derisive humility found in this passage falls in line with the reality that the speaker has laid out for 
us; if this reality is utterly averse to Agapian love, then commitment is undoubtedly anathema to 
it. Thus, it is unsurprising that the speaker finds themselves, along with their partner, failing at 
every turn and succumbing to the same vices expressed previously. Their own fixation on the 
present moment, for instance, is made clear by their tendency to over-suffer and not suffer enough; 
in other words, like Tristan and Isolde, they nullify their own fears temporarily by “[making] pas-
sion out of passion’s obstacles,” yet this has the effect of prolonging their suffering unnecessarily. 
And yet, seemingly locked in this state of existence, the speaker suggests that the only way forward 
is acceptance, or conscious appreciation, of these tendencies: 
The decorative manias we obey 
Die in grimaces round us every day, 
Yet through their tohu-bohu comes a voice 
Which utters an absurd command—Rejoice. (248) 
Interestingly, the speaker defines their tendencies as part of the “tohu-bohu,” a biblical phrase 
which captures the state of earth prior to the creation of light, which is characterized by emptiness, 
confusion, and more relevantly, vanity. In doing so, they situate the emergence of the “absurd 
command” parallel to the crying child in “Like a Vocation;” the command penetrates the chaos for 
no discernible reason, nevertheless providing a momentary glimpse of what reality could be. This 
seems to be what makes this command so absurd: it exists even though the speaker’s relationship 
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is rife with flaws and is often—if not almost always—moving away from that imaginative plane 
which they strive for. 
A sudden shift takes place a few stanzas on, wherein the couple’s supposed misjudgments 
and egotism are suddenly rendered meaningless by an unknown force, likened to the capital-A-
“Absurd.” The speaker proceeds, “Rejoice, dear love, in Love’s peremptory word; / All chance, 
all love, all logic, you and I, / Exist by grace of the Absurd” (248). The insouciant nature of this 
passage is not to suggest genuine indifference towards their actions; instead, Love’s unwavering 
authority—the “peremptory word”—trumps all other dissenting voices, even the speaker’s (and 
thus Auden’s) own. They recognize that their love is both genuine and rare, and—given the count-
less forces in place to try and stop it—should not exist. Essentially, this is what transfigures this 
Love, and the unknown force which bestowed it upon them, “Absurd.” Thus, the speaker seeks to 
savor this gift in all its unlikeness and by the only means they know possible. Insisting that “with-
out conscious artifice we die” (248), in a self-mocking, yet triumphant tone, they continue, “de-
scribe round our chaotic malice now, / The arbitrary circle of a vow” (248). In this vein, the act of 
“conscious artifice” (here, through the artificial construction of marriage) becomes the only 
method of survival for the speaker’s relationship, the likes of which are, by its artificial nature, 
inherently frivolous but nonetheless vital. Bringing to memory Auden’s espoused belief in the 
“doubleness” (not to be confused with the “double-focus”) of marriage (Gottlieb 31), the speaker’s 
resignation to and subsequent acceptance of the arbitrary nature of marital vows reveals their im-
bibement of that same “reverent frivolity” that emerges in New Year Letter. In regarding their 
marriage with equal seriousness and frivolity (Gottlieb 31), the speaker escapes suffocating feel-
ings of wrongdoing and hopelessness, yet this same logic also enables them to face the adversity 
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before them and, from the Love which they have begun to cultivate in their marriage, move in the 
direction of “Love’s imagination” in its broadest sense. 
 What follows this passage is a benediction—or more accurately an explication of the vows 
mentioned previously—which situates the speaker’s marriage as a starting place in search of 
“Love’s imagination.” On the one hand, these “vows” are intended to be a protective measure in 
preserving the authenticity of the marriage itself; thus, the speaker expresses their conviction “that 
this round O of faithfulness […] / […] never wither to an empty nought” (Auden 249), as well as 
their determination never to “take […] love for granted, [recognizing that] Love permit / Tempta-
tions always to endanger it” (249). In laying out the indefinite threats against this marriage, the 
speaker hopes to remain conscious of them so as to take the necessary steps in warding them off 
when necessary; “Temptation,” like the Devil in New Year Letter, functions in one sense to warn 
the speaker that something has gone wrong and that maintenance of some sort is required. It is this 
same logic of reiterative, conscious contemplation that underscores the journey towards “Love’s 
imagination,” an endeavor that will be equally as challenging as the speaker’s marriage. Indeed, 
the speaker links this logic to this larger effort in the final stanza; emboldened by the support of 
their partner, the speaker insists that “we try / To set up shop on Goodwin Sands, / That we, though 
lovers, may love soberly” (249), while nonetheless beseeching “fate […] / [….] [to] hold [them] 
to the ordinary way” (249). It seems less likely that the speaker’s desire to reside on “Goodwin 
Sands” (a real sandbank in Kent, England) is literal; rather, it appears to be, like the invocation of 
English scenery in New Year Letter, a “mode of thought” through which they visualize that imag-
inative plane, that Good place brought forth by Love. The only route by which they will achieve 
or, at the very least, approach their destination is to resist sensationalism and temptation alike, 
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hence “the ordinary way.” In what appears to be a direct acknowledgment of the duo’s imperfec-
tions, this “ordinary way” becomes the only route through which Truth emerges. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Considering these four works of poetry in comparison to one another, the links become 
ever clearer in their contribution to Auden’s burgeoning ideologies throughout this period. Across 
these works, two modes of thought seem to be formulating in parallel: one which conceptualizes 
a total reconstitution of reality to serve the needs of all and the precise methods by which to achieve 
that reality; and another which explores the imperfect nature of private relationships and how those 
shortcomings can be redirected towards mutually productive ends. Nevertheless, almost immedi-
ately we witness these two modes of thought overlap. In “Like a Vocation,” the speaker’s search 
for the means by which to bring about real community that does not depart, reflected in part 
through the poem’s second-person subject, is interrupted by the irresistible force of childlike cry-
ing; immediately the second-person subject is overtaken by the desire to bring comfort to this 
voice, and it is here that the poem gestures towards Agapian love as a potential solution to depar-
ture. We see this potential solution built upon in “Law Like Love,” wherein speech itself is inter-
rogated as a potential obstacle to the discovery of “Law,” the likes of which may play a vital role 
in bringing about the “unconcerned condition” the speaker describes. While reticence is at the 
heart of the poem, the speaker nonetheless voices their belief that “Law” resembles love, taking 
their own, albeit flawed, relationship as evidence. New Year Letter, among many other things, 
personifies the myriad forces which hold back reality from returning to its natural state, barring 
not only community but love itself. Additionally, we witness the speaker set a course forward in 
combatting these forces, acknowledging that—like the turbulent nature of their marriage—their 
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efforts will be rife with error and miscalculations that should not be denounced but instead ac-
cepted. And in what is effectively a revisiting of this impending quest, “In Sickness and in Health” 
situates marriage’s propensity for error at the core of progress. In other words, the speaker’s mar-
riage is not simply a starting point through which Agapian love may come to fruition—it is also a 
model which highlights the calamitous route that love must traverse to be bring about that afore-
mentioned community. 
 These same recurring themes highlight an incipient avenue of thought that accounts for 
queerness and Christianity in tandem, reflecting the core values of modern queer Christian theo-
logians and people. Certainly, radical love, which transcends conditionality and borders, is un-
doubtedly at the heart of these works. The transformative power of this love—engendered through 
selfless compassion, the willingness to listen rather than speak, and the presumption of fallibility—
is demonstrated in the way their speakers meticulously conceptualize a reality that accounts for 
this unconditionality, not in a utopian sense but in an approach that accounts for mundane, and 
thereby realistic, human experience. Amid this conceptualizing, the experiences of homosexuals, 
among other marginalized groups, are not overlooked. Indeed, the speaker’s efforts do not simply 
imply but advocate explicitly for an overhaul of the current system of affairs; this is a system that 
not only bars higher forms of love, and thereby community, but also inhibits disproportionately 
the livelihoods of specific groups based on their inability to fit within the conventions of that sys-
tem. Moreover, these poems not only reject fractured community and demagogic rhetoric but con-
ventional definitions of marriage as well, and this rejection is deliberate. As Gottlieb states, Au-
den’s views on marriage as institutional, and his “arbitrary” subversion of that institution in “In 
Sickness and in Health,” reflects his conviction that “everyone and anyone to create the circle, 
without reliance on commanding authorities and superior models [….] [Therefore] everyone is 
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thus enjoined to marry in his or her manner, to his or her liking; and no agent—whether religious, 
legal, or even aesthetic—is invested with the power to punctuate the present by pronouncing a 
marriage valid ‘now’” (40). As a further matter, rendering such an institution “arbitrary,” and sub-
sequently likening the speaker’s relationship as bestowed by an “Absurd” force, queers heteronor-
mative notions of marriage and religion, thereby enabling access to these institutions for all who 
desire it (and specifically those who have been denied it historically). 
 It should be noted that significant attention has been brought to Auden’s views on marriage 
in the past, suggesting similarly that it stands as a microcosmic model by which global crises may 
be remedied over time. Through marriage, Mendelson states in his critical biography, Auden iden-
tified “an alternative to the group and political life in which he had hoped to submerge his solitude 
[…] it was the personal love [his vision] had prophesied” (381). Nevertheless, these criticisms 
(Mendelson’s and Gottlieb’s notwithstanding) often overshadow Auden’s homosexuality in rela-
tion to this model of marriage or suggest that it serves as an opposing tension. On the contrary, at 
the height of Auden’s marriage to Chester Kallman do we find a bold, albeit subliminal, transgres-
sion of heteronormative oppression which, among other things, has, on the grounds of sexuality, 
barred access to genuine expressions of love and participation in community-based religion. Ac-
counting for Auden’s supposedly uncertain views on the moral nature of homosexuality and erotic 
love, even, his characterization of Eros in “In Sickness and in Health” is admittedly forgiving. 
Certainly, the speaker suggests that the so-called political adoration of Eros is problematic; how-
ever, their solution is not to eradicate its presence but to reinstate balance between the erotic and 
the Agapian, sharing partial resemblance with Althaus-Reid’s claims. This problem, too, appears 
to span the whole of humanity regardless of individual sexual preference. All of this is to say that 
the positioning of homosexuality in relation to this model of marriage is by no means 
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supplementary; rather, it is an imperative component that in large part dictates its utility and rele-
vance in a modern context. Akin to the “conscious artifice” underscoring the speaker’s marital 
vows in “In Sickness and in Health,” Auden’s use of marriage as a model is not so much an invo-
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